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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4- 103(e) as an appeal from the final judgment of a District Court. 
ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in two (2) separate cases which 
were consolidated for all purposes in the trial court and then on appeal. "We 
review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 'abuse 
of discretion' standard, incorporating the 'clearly erroneous' standard for the trial 
court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision.1" State v. LehL 
2003 Utah App. 212, 73 P.3d 985 Plain error is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness." State v. TarnawieckL 2000 Utah App. 186, 5 P.3d 1222; State v. 
Smit 2004 Utah App. 222, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah App. 2004) The issue was 
preserved for appeal by filing a notice of appeal after a written decision. 
STATEMENT OF RULE/STATUTE AT ISSUE 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides how a person 
must plea, what the Court must look at in a withdrawal of a plea, and therefore, 
included is Rule 11. The provisions Defendant believes are applicable are1: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
Rule 11 may be found in its entirety in the Addendum at A23-A25. 
1 
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(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of 
defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that 
the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record 
2 
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as a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply 
with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a 
guilty plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural Background 
Defendant was charged with violating a stalking injunction on two (2) 
separate occasions and, thus, in two (2) separate cases. There were four (4) counts 
in one (1) case and two (2) counts in the other. All counts alleged violations of a 
stalking injunction; all six (6) counts were Class A Misdemeanors. (Addendum 
A19-A22) (Clerk's Record 1,157,159) 
Defendant plead guilty to one (1) count in each case for a total of two (2) 
counts and the other counts were dismissed under a plea agreement with the State. 
(CR15 7,15 9) After entry of the pleas and on the day of sentencing, Defendant 
moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Addendum A10-A11, CR 92) The Court 
denied the motion to withdraw pleas and Defendant timely appealed. (Addendum 
A1-A4, CR144, 161, 165) This court consolidated the cases for appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charges and Pleas 
Defendant was charged with four (4) separate violations of the staking 
statutes as found in Utah Code §76-5-106.5 on May 3, 2009. A Temporary Civil 
Stalking Injunction had been issued against Defendant by the Court on April 17, 
2009, prohibiting Defendant from having any contact with Shere Susanna Holtz 
and Chandler Alan Holtz. (Record 1, 157, 159, Addendum A15, A19 and A21) 
3 
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Defendant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea along with 
both the State's and Defendant's Counsel on October 19, 2009. (Record 85, 
Addendum A5) The judgment and sentence was signed August 10, 2010, but not 
filed with the clerk of the court until August 19, 2010. (Record 157, 159, 
Addendum A19, A21) The first Notice of Appeal was filed August 20, 2010, and 
an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 30, 2010. (Record 161, 165) 
History of the Case as Summarized by the Trial Court 
The motion to withdraw the plea was heard before the Court on April 26, 
2010, and continued for additional testimony to July 1, 2010. (T,4/26/10,Pl,Ll 1, 
P32, L8) Prior to commencement of the hearing, the court outlined the history of 
the case as follows: 
1. On July 20, 2009, the case was set for a jury trial. (T,4/26/10,Pl,L23) 
2. On September 14, 2009, at a final Pretrial, the court was advised that 
the case would go to trial and not settle. (T,4/26/10,Pl,L24) 
3. On October 19, 2009, Defendant and counsel appeared before the 
court and Defendant entered pleas under a plea agreement with the 
State. (T,4/26/10,P2,L2) 
4. On November 23, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
pleas. (T,4/26/10,P2,L6) 
5. The next day, November 24, 2009, after filing the motion to withdraw 
pleas, counsel for Defendant moved to withdraw as attorney for 
Defendant on the basis that counsel might be a witness in the motion 
4 
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to withdraw pleas. (T,4/26/10,P2,L8) 
Thereafter followed a number of continuances because Defendant had 
difficulty finding new counsel. (T,4/26/10,P2,L10) 
New/Replacement Counsel's Conflict of Interest 
Just before the plea withdrawal hearing on April 26, 2010, new/replacement 
counsel for Defendant moved to withdraw as attorney for Defendant based on 
"some difficulties that had arisen between counsel" and Defendant. (T,4/26/10, 
P2,L21) At the April 26, 2010, hearing Defendant was given the option of 
proceeding as his own lawyer or to proceed with his counsel in the role as an 
advisor. Faced with these choices, Defendant elected to proceed with counsel. 
(T,4/26/10,P3,L5-25) 
The basis of the difficulties between Defendant and his second attorney was 
an employment relationship of his attorney with his former counsel whom 
Defendant believed had committed malpractice. Defendant did not believe that his 
replacement counsel would pursue his claims properly because he had, at one 
time, been an employee of his former counsel. (T,4/26/10,P3,L17-P5,L4) 
Replacement counsel expressed to the Court that the choice given to Defendant 
was, in effect, no choice at all. (T,4/26/10,P3,L2) The Court did not see a 
problem: (T,4/26/10,P5,L10) 
Defendant: Well, I don't know that there's any -1 don't know that there's a 
problem, I just -1 don't feel that Danny really wants to question Rhome the 
way he, an attorney who doesn't have a relationship with Rhome would -
would proceed with it. 
Court: Well, I suppose we'll just have to see at the hearing 
5 
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(T,4/26/10,P5,L13) 
Trial Court's Decision on Conflict 
The conflict issue was never revisited. The court decided that there had been 
a number of delays and, regardless of disputes with counsel, there would not be 
any further delays. [" see the difficulty from the court's view is just that we 
need to get this resolved one way or the other and go forward" (T,4/26/10,P6,L3)] 
It appears that the trial court was more concerned with expedience rather than due 
process. The court had its mind made up that "we've got to move forward today". 
(T,4/26/10,P6,L22) It is noteworthy that the hearing was continued for additional 
testimony to July 1, 2010, some months later. (T,4/26/10,P31,L6) 
Plea Hearing of October 19, 2009 
At the commencement of the hearing of April 26, 2010, counsel for 
Defendant requested the Court to listen to the plea hearing that had occurred on 
October 19, 2009. A copy of a CD from the Court's recording system was marked 
and admitted as Exhibit 1. The Court requested a transcript of the October 19, 
2009, hearing which was provided. Appearing for Defendant at the October 19, 
2009, hearing was attorney Rhome D. Zabriskie. (T, 10/19/09,P3,L9) 
Counsel for Defendant set forth the agreement as to the "case ending 141" 
and stated "it's agreed by the parties that the defendant will enter a guilty plea to 
count 1 the State would move to dismiss counts 2,3 and 4". (T,10/19/09,P3,L20) 
As to the case "ending in 142, likewise the defendant would enter a guilty plea to 
count l...the State would move to dismiss count 2". The agreement further 
6 
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specified that "there's a case where there is a pending investigation that the State 
will not pursue those allegations further." (T,10/19/09,P4,L1) 
The Court then asked a series of questions related to the agreement and 
representation of counsel as follows: (T, 10/19/09,P4,L 15) 
Court: Mr. Nielsen, have you had enough time to visit with your attorney 
about this plea agreement? 
Defendant: Yes, I have. 
Court: Are you satisfied with the advice and help he had provided you? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Court: Do you need any time to ask him any additional questions? 
Defendant: No, Your Honor. 
Court: Have you read that document that is there on the podium entitled 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Court: Do you understand it? 
Defendant? Yup. 
Court: Do you have questions about any part of it? 
Defendant: No, I don't, Your Honor. 
The balance of the information which must be given to Defendant was 
found in the Statement of Defendant Upon Plea of Guilty. There was no inquiry at 
this point about the Defendant's mental state or capacity to understand even 
though there was when the motion to withdraw pleas was filed. 
7 
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Motion to Withdraw Plead on November 24, 2009 
Sentencing was scheduled for November 24, 2009. On that day, counsel for 
Defendant appeared with him and handed the Court the motion to withdraw the 
pleas which was filed the previous day. The court stated that it had already read 
the pre-sentence report and was prepared to pronounce sentence. 
(T,l l/24/09,P3,L8) The State objected to withdrawal of the pleas. (T,l 1/24/09, 
P3,L17) Counsel for Defendant cited several district court decisions from around 
the state to support his motion. (T,l l/24/09,P4,L7) The Court indicated that the 
practice in Box Elder County was different depending on the position of the 
prosecutor. (T,l 1/24/09, P4,L22) Counsel for Defendant admitted that the pleas 
may not have been voluntary: (T,ll/24/09,P5,L10) 
Mr. Zarbriskie: I don't think it is disputed between the parties that David is 
not your typical defendant that comes before this court. He has a malady 
that he struggled with for some time, that being his bipolar condition, which 
our good doctor here has been working with David on for some time. 
in my experience in representing defendants throughout the state, when I 
am dealing with people who suffer from either a bipolar condition or a 
similar psychological malady, they sometimes are maybe a little more 
susceptible to the persuasion that we defense attorneys exercise upon them 
in our efforts to get them to do what we think is the right thing in the case. 
Mr. Zarbriskie went on to explain that Defendant's doctor "was completely 
shocked that he had plead to these charges and had not gone to trial as he had 
planned". (T,l l/24/09,P6,L4) The doctor explained that Defendant did not want 
to plea to the charges and had only agreed "after strong urging by his attorney". 
(T,l l/24/09,P6,L5) Mr. Zarbriskie admitted he would not make these arguments 
with other clients, but that in the case of Defendant, he believed that he was "more 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
susceptible to persuasion" than others. (T,l l/24/09,P6,L13) 
The Court also pointed out that the Defendant probably did not understand 
the implications of his pleas on his status as a parolee from Idaho transferred to 
Utah under the Interstate Compact; his counsel admitted this was probably the 
case as well. (T,l l/24/09,P7,L6) As a result of these pleas, Defendant has been 
extradited to Idaho and is facing revocation of his parol there and imprisonment. 
While agreeing that Defendant's concerns about his parol status were legitimate, 
the court stated that it still viewed the situation as a legal rather than a factual 
issue. (T,ll/24/09,P7,L14) 
The trial court did not believe that much would be accomplished by an 
evidentiary hearing, but set one (1) anyway at the request of the prosecutor. 
(T,l l/24/09,P8,L21) The Court viewed the "big issue" as the impact of the plea on 
the Idaho parol. (T,l 1/24/09, P9,L1) The State and counsel for Defendant then 
agreed that counsel for Defendant would be withdrawn from the case. 
(T,ll/24/09,P12,L9) 
Hearing of April 26.2010 
Defendant testified on April 26, 2010, that he entered the pleas on October 
19, 2009. (T,4/26/10,P14,Ll 1) Prior to discussing what was said by his prior 
attorney, Defendant waived the attorney client privilege. (T,4/26/10,P15,L3) He 
never discussed the terms of the plea agreement with former counsel, but simply 
signed the Statement of Defendant Upon Plea of Guilty because his attorney told 
him to sign it. (T,4/26/10,P16,Ll) 
9 
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Defendant testified that he met with former counsel on the night prior to 
entry of the plea for about two (2) hours. He was told at this meeting that he 
needed to plea guilty. The terms of the plea offer were never discussed during this 
meeting. (T,4/26/10,P156L12) Indeed, Defendant had never discussed the facts of 
his case with his prior attorney and could not understand why his lawyer would 
want him to plea. (T,4/26/10,P16,L19) 
During the meeting on Sunday night, Defendant just listened, but did not 
ask questions nor did he agree to plea. (T,4/26/10,P18,L7) When Defendant left 
this Sunday evening meeting with his former lawyer, he had not decided anything 
about the plea. (T,4/26/l0,P 18,L23) By the time Defendant arrived at court to 
enter a plea, he still had not decided to plea. (T,4/26/10,P18,L2) Defendant 
continued to be concerned that his former lawyer had never sat with him and heard 
what the case was about factually. (T,4/26/10,P19,L9) 
The next morning, Defendant arrived at court early with the expectation that 
his former attorney would discuss the case more with him, however, when his 
attorney arrived, he went into a conference room, but not with Defendant. 
(T,4/26/10, P19,L21) Before Defendant could meet with his lawyer, the Court's 
bailiff called the case. (T,4/26/10,P20,L2) It was not until he was presented with 
the plea documents did he again have a brief conversation with his lawyer. 
(T,4/26/10,P20,L9) 
Defendant signed the plea documents because he "didn't want to hold up the 
proceedings anymore " (T,4/26/10,P21,Ll) Never did Defendant tell his 
10 
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former lawyer that he would agree to plea. (T,4/26/10,P22,L8) The Defendant 
listened to the trial court's questions about entry of the plea as set forth on a Court 
CD (Exhibit l2) and stated that he only said he was entering a plea voluntarily 
because he did not want to be "confrontational" with the judge and that when he 
tried to explain things to the judge, his lawyer jumped in and would not allow it. 
(T,4/26/10,P23,L3-15) 
On November 23 or 24, 2009, Defendant, while at court, had a discussion 
with his former lawyer about the terms of the plea. (T,4/26/10,P23,L20) He did 
not know until more than a month later some of the conditions. (T,4/26/10,P24,Ll) 
Defendant testified that he has been diagnosed with atypical bipolarism. 
(T,4/26/10,P24,L19) This mental illness affected Defendant when certain 
"triggers" occurred and caused him to react in a patterned form; mostly these 
triggers occur from stress, including the stress of court. (T,4/26/10,P24,L24) The 
effect of these triggers on Defendant is that he does not sleep and comes to a point 
where he will say anything a persons wants of him. (T,4/26/10,P25,L3) He 
becomes compulsive over cleaning thing as well. (T,4/26/10,P25,L7) 
Of importance to this case is that Defendant's mental health effects his 
ability to make decisions. (T,4/26/10,P25,L15) At the time Defendant entered the 
pleas on October 19, 2009, he was under treatment for his atypical bipolarism. 
(T,4/26/10,P25,L25) The treatment commenced in March 2007, and consisted of 
2Prior to testimony, the parties went into the judge's chambers and listened 
to the October 19, 2009, questioning by the Court at the plea hearing. The CD 
was marked and admitted at Exhibit 1. (T,4/26/10,P9,L20 & P10,L6) 
11 
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meetings with a mental health professional once a week at which he discussed 
decisions and life in general. (T,4/26/10,P26L14) Defendant had consistently told 
his mental health professional that he was innocent of these charges and that he 
always intended to proceed to trial to prove he was innocence. (T,4/26/10, 
P27,L12) He had discussed this in his counseling session on the Thursday prior to 
the plea and at that time he did not want to plea, but wanted to go to trial. 
(T,4/26/10,P29,L5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow 
him to withdraw his pleas and to be represented by counsel of his choice at the 
plea withdrawal hearing given his mental health problems. The mental health 
implications are shown in the Pre-Sentence Report. Defendant will do whatever a 
person in authority tells him must be done. (Confidential Envelope Containing 
Pre-Sentence Report and Addendum - Al2) 
There was a mental health evaluation performed on Defendant and in the 
possession of the trial court at the time the motion to withdraw pleas was denied. 
(Pre-Sentence Report) Defendant's pleas were not voluntarily made. Defendant's 
position was that his mental illness overrode his free will, so that the plea 
agreements were not voluntary. (T,4/26/10,P12,Ll) 
ARGUMENTS 
Our criminal justice system is not well equipped to handle people who are 
mentally ill and who commit criminal acts. As noted by Defendant's attorney, 
12 
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there was "no dispute between the parties" that Defendant was not your typical 
defendant. He had struggled for years with mental health issues. In looking at 
whether the trial court abused its discretion, the Court should consider whether the 
discretion properly took into account Defendant's mental health. 
There is also no dispute that Defendant said the right words at his plea 
hearing, signed the correct forms and responded to the Court's inquiries with the 
proper answers. If Defendant were a "normal" or "average" defendant, the Court 
would not need to read further in this brief to sustain the trial court. However, 
Defendant was and is not a "normal" or "average" defendant. The Court 
acknowledged this simple fact. The real question in this appeal is what impact, if 
any, does the mental health of a defendant have on the plea process. No new law is 
needed, however, rather all that is needed is a close implementation of existing 
law. In State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403 (1986), the Utah Supreme Court explained 
what needs to be present for a defendant's plea to be valid: 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea since he did not understand the nature 
of the charges against him or the consequences of his plea 
We have held that the absence of a finding under this section is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences 
and of the rights he was waiving. Brooks v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 310 
(1985); Warner v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 309 (1985). 
The question is whether the " record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
that the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights he was waiving". Did Defendant's mental health 
13 
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play into the "whole" record here? The facts cannot be read with any degree of 
reasonable understanding without leading to a conclusion that Defendant's mental 
health was one (1) of the most, if not the most, important factor in determining if 
the trial Court exercised its discretion properly and without abuse. 
In a different context, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Barrett, 2006 
Utah App. 417, 147 P.3d 491 (2006) discussed what should be taken into account 
when determining if a confession is voluntary, not unlike determining if a 
defendant understands what he is doing when he pleas: 
we must therefore determine whether the statements Defendant made 
prior to his Miranda warnings were "[]accompanied by any actual coercion 
or other circumstances calculated to undermine [his] ability to exercise 
his free will." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285. To determine 
whether a suspectfs statements were coerced, courts look to the totality of 
circumstances. Factors to consider in examining the totality of the 
circumstances include not only the crucial element of police coercion, the 
length of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, defendant's 
maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health. (Emphasis 
added.) 
When looking at whether a criminal suspect or defendant is acting with free 
will when actions are contrary to his rights, the Court must look at the mental 
health as well as all other factors surrounding the plea. Here, the Defendant said 
the correct words and signed the correct forms. At the original scheduled 
sentencing on November 24, 2009, the Court had read the pre-sentence report, 
including the report on Defendant's mental health. When considering the motion 
to withdraw the plea, the Court should have considered Defendant's ability to fully 
understand and act with his mental health limitations at the time of the plea. 
While no court has ever held that a defendant's mental health care provider 
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should be required to certify that a defendant is acting knowingly or voluntarily, in 
this case, such testimony would have insured a free will plea. In a mandatory death 
penalty appeal, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Aquelles . 2003 Utah 1, 63 
P.3d 731 (Utah 2003), stated that pleading to a criminal charge involves the 
principles of due process and requires the present mental ability to understand: 
It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be mentally 
competent to plead guilty and to stand trial. "A mentally incompetent 
defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings against such a defendant 
do not comport with due process." Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, 20 P.3d 382 
(quoting State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989) 
Section 77-15-1 of the Utah Code mandates that "[n]o person who is 
incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-15-1 (2002). Section 77-15-2 defines a defendant's incompetency to 
proceed as an "inability to have a rational and factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; o r . . . his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in 
the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2(l)-(2) (2002). 
We have held that "[i]n determining whether a defendant is competent to 
plead guilty, the trial court must consider whether the defendant has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him." State v. Holland, 921 
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)). 
"" [Competency is established when a defendant can, but not necessarily 
will, assist or consult with counsel.'" State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 51, 20 
P.3d 342 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 668 (Utah 1997)) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendant submits that the record establishes that at the time he entered his 
pleas, Defendant was not acting with free will. He gave in to the influences of his 
lawyer. He wanted to go to trial and as soon as he was with someone he felt he 
could speak his mind to, did so; i.e. when his mental health counselor returned, 
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Defendant told him what had happened which "shocked" his counselor. 
CONCLUSIONS/RELIEF REQUESTED 
The trial court should have granted Defendants motion to withdraw his plea 
under the facts of this case. Defendant suffered from mental impairment at the 
time he entered his plea. The Court did not give Defendant a choice when it gave 
him the option of moving forward with a lawyer whom he believed had a conflict 
of interest or by requiring Defendant to represent himself. The Court knew of 
Defendant's mental health problems when he gave Defendant this option. 
The Court abused its discretion by ignoring Defendant's lengthy history of 
mental problems and by requiring Defendant to proceed with a lawyer who had a 
conflict of interest. This Court should grant the motion to set aside the pleas as an 
abuse of discretion. 
Dated this 18th day of January, 2011. 
C. 
Appellate Attorney for Defendant 
Utah State Bar Number 0554 
3241 East Shea Blvd., Suite 1 
Phoenix, Arizona, 85028 
(602) 788-7227 
Email: bobcollins@collinslaw.net 
©ERT COLONS 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage prepaid, on the 20th day of January, 2011, to the following: 
Brandon Maynard 
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney 
9 West Forest Street, Suite 310 
BrighanrCJty, Utah, 84302 
C.^OBERT COLLINS 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Appellate 
Procedure, an addendum to this brief follows. The addendum contains: 
1. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures. 
2. Decision of the trial court denying Motion to Withdraw Plea. 
3. Excerpts of transcripts on appeal. 
4. Transcript of the court's oral decision. 
Dated this 18th day of January, 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures. 
Decision of the trial court denying Motion to Withdraw Plea. 
Excerpts of transcripts on appeal. 
Transcript of the court's oral decision. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE 091100141 
and 
091100142 
Judge Ben H Hadfield 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea. The plea was entered on October 19, 2009, approximately 48 hours before the 
scheduled jury trial was to begin. Defendant entered guilty pleas to two class A 
misdemeanor charges of Violation of a Stalking Injunction, and in exchange, four similar 
charges were dismissed, and the State promised not to file an additional charge whfch was 
under investigation. At the scheduled sentencing hearing on November 24, 2009, 
Defendant moved to w thdrawthe guilty plea.- Defense counsel, Mr Zabriskie, afso moved 
to withdraw as counsel and the matter was continued so that Defendant could secure other 
legal counsel. 
On Decern be 
advised the court that 
next held on January 
hearing on the motion 
22, 2009, a status hearing was held, at which time Defendant 
: (attorney Danny Frazier was not available that day. A hearing was 
I, 2010, attended by the defendant and his attorney, Mr Frazier. A 
i jto withdraw plea was set for March 1,2010. On February 26,2010, 
Mr Frazier filed a Motiqn for Continuance. The matter was rescheduled to April 26, 2010, 
at 2:30. 
On April 22, 21010, Mr Frazier filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. A hearing 
was held on April 29, 2010. The Motion to Withdraw as Counsel was considered. The 
defendant was advisep that the hearing would proceed on that date and that he could 
either proceed pro se if he agreed for Mr Frazier to be excused, or the hearing would 
•ML - 0 MJ0 
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proceed with Mr Frazier serving as Defendant's counsel. The defendant chose to proceed 
with Mr Frazier's assistance. At the conclusion of the day on April 29, 2010, the hearing 
2010, at 9:00 a.m. 
(approximately 36 hours prior to the July 1 * hearing, the defendant 
was continued to July 1 ,| 
Sixty days later, 
filed a pro se Motion to Continue, indicating that he wanted to hire another attorney and 
have Mr Frazier excused. The court denied this motion on the basis that any new attorney 
should have been procured in the previous months and, if he or she had been available 
for the July 1 hearing, wouid have been allowed to proceed. 
At the hearing i n July 1, the court heard from Dr Gary Sazma, Utahna Nielsen, 
(and RhomeZabriskie, the defendantsformer counsel. Defendant 
re to call any other witnesses. Defendant had personally testified 
the defendant's mother, 
indicated he did not desi 
at the April 29, 2010 hearing. The court advised counsel that It would take this matter 
under advisement and prepare a memorandum decision. 
The court has reviewed the transcript of the change of plea on October 19,2009, 
The court has also listened to those proceedings so that it could hear the voice intonations 
and other subtleties wnich are often involved in communication. The Defendant did not 
sound hesitant nor confused at the hearing. He answered questions directly. In reviewing 
the summary of evidence as stated by the prosecutor. Defendant made a clarification 
because he feii the version stated by the prosecutor was not entirely accurate. 
The court has also reviewed the written Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel as filed in each case. Defendant has not raised an issue 
regarding these documents, and they appear to contain the required language and 
signatures. 
The crux of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw seems to be the allegation that the 
defendant, because of nis bi-polar condition, is anxious to please, and is easily persuaded 
to go along with what simeone says. The essence of the argument being that Mr Zabriskie 
had overridden the defendant's will and coerced him into entering a guilty plea. The 
defendant's testimony regarding a meeting with counsel the night before the plea, is quite 
illuminating. 
Q: What happened-what else happened tha t -
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asWed 
Ine 
A: They 
decision 
Beginning at 
Q: As of the 
plea agreement? 
A: No. We 
me what I wanted to do, and I told them that I hadn't made a 
^nd that I would talk to them in the morning about i t . . . 
23: 
time you left this meeting, you still had not decided to enter into a 
overwhelmed or who i 
defendant suggests la 
which decision he wou 
p.o 
were going to discuss it in the morning of court. Transcript p. 18 
This recollection by the Defendant does not evidence someone who is easily 
anxious to please and agrees with whatever an attorney might 
suggest or recommend. On the contrary, it appears that after a meeting which the 
apted two hours, the defendant was stilJ unwilling to commit as to 
id make. This testimony by the defendant seems to directly conflict 
with Dr Gary Sazma's testimony suggesting the.defendant is anxious to please and would 
go along with whatever an attorney suggested. 
Dr Gary Sazmk the defendant's therapist, testified that the defendant was not in 
a manic state on the date of the guilty plea nor in the weeks following. Dr Sazrna, under 
cross examination, admitted that the defendant tied to him about his reasons for missing 
two counseling sessions. 
Additionally, in a handwritten statement created by the defendant five days after 
the guitty plea, the defendant advised Adult Probation and Parole of the facts constituting 
the offense. He wrote 
court nor the prosecutor nor defense counsel were present to override his free will. 
The defendan 
out his version of those facts, admitting the offense. Neither the 
*s mother, Utahna Nielsen, testified that because of Defendant's 
condition, she was present with him at every court hearing and at every meeting held with 
his attorneys. She told the court that she did not feel Defendant understood things at the 
time of his guilty piea. However, she did not provide any testimony suggesting that she had 
confronted defense counsel either prior to the guilty plea hearing or afterwards in an 
attempt to "set the record straight". The first such claim occurred five weeks later, after the 
presentence report haa been prepared and received. 
Mr Rhome Zamriskie testified that before court on the morning of the guilty plea, 
he spent "considerable time with Defendant that morning*. The hearing was scheduled for 
9:00 a.m. but did not actually begin until 9:30. Mr Zabriskie further acknowledged that at 
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J was made, he, as counsel fcr the defendant believed that the 
ijy and voluntarily entering the guilty pleas. He further testified that 
during his representation of the defendant in preparation for trial, the defendant seemed 
to have unreasonable expectations with regards to atrial outcome. The defendant seemed 
not to recognize what his own attorney characterized as an "overwhelming amount of 
evidence" against the defendant. 
Entering a guilty plea to a criminal charge in a court of record is a stressful 
occasion for nearly every individual who undergoes this experience; 
Virtually m defendants have misgivings about pleading guilty. 
Virtually all defendants are conflicted, in that they would prefer not to be 
convicted 
In this court's 18 years of experience, these things do not suggest that the 
defendant is coerced ondoes not understand the ramifications of a guilty plea, Ratherthey 
suggest a comprehenspn of all of the circumstances involved and the ramifications. ' 
Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that there has not been a showing of 
good cause on the part of the defendant to set aside the guilty plea and the motion is 
denied. Sentencing hearing is scheduled for July 20, 2010, at 9:00 a.m. 
Dated this the *? day of July 2010. 
_ _ ^ BY THE COURT 
4&g$. OP tiif*^ 
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I certify that a 
following people 
specified. 
435 /da- r ia r r* ** 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
copy of the attached document was sent to the 
for case 091100141 by the method and on the date 
MAIL: DAVID SHUIjWAY NIELSEN C/O UTAKNA NIELSEN 2460 S 500 W PERRY, 
UT 843 02 
FRAZIER JR PO BOX 16 6 DRAPER UT 84020 
HADFIELD 9 W FOREST STREET STE 310 BRIGKAM CITY 
MAIL: C DANNY E 
Q J^ tf-MftXfc: STEPHEN R 
Date: H l/3d ULQ- rid fa 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN, 
Defendant, 
! STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN 
SUPPORT OF PLEA AND 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No: 091100141 
I, David Shumway Nielsen, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s): 
Crime & Statutory Degree Punishment 
Provision Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Count 1- Violation of Stalking Injunction (2032) A 0-360 days in jail 
0-$2,500 fine plus 
§76-5-106,5 an 85% surcharge 
T have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to 
me, and 1 understand the nature and the elements of the crimes) to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
Count 1: 
-did knowingly and intentionally violate a stalking injunction. 
1 understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above, or if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing crimes. 
I stipulate and agree, or if! am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest that the following 
facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. 
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty, or no contest plea(s) and prove the 
elements of the crime(s) to which 1 ara pleading guilty or no contest: 
A ^ 
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-On or about May 3, 2009, in Box Elder County, the defendant was discovered by 
law enforcement to have made phone calls to Shere Holtz in violation of a stalking 
injunction that was issued April 17,2009, 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
1 hereby certify that I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the 
consequences of my guilty or not contest plea(s) with my attorney, Rhome D Zabriskie, and I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty or no 
contest and the consequences of my plea(s). 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the Constitution of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty 
or no contest I will give up all the following rights: 
Jury Trial. I know that I have right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty or no contest. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial 1 would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and my 
attorney would have the right opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified 
against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those cost 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof* J know that if I do not plead guilty or 
no contest, I am presumed innocent until the State proves that 1 am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, 1 need only plead "not guilty," and my case 
will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the 
charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, 
meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty or no contest, I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, 1 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
<3> 
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appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty or no contest. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above* 
Consequences of Entering a Guilt}' or >o Contest Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty or not contest. I know that by pleading guilty or no contest to a 
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, 1 will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory 
penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison/jail term, fine, or both. 
Surcharge- 1 know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, 
including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea 
agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be impose one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty or no contest, my guilty or 
no contest plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. [f the offense 
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole. I know the law 
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are 
fiillv contained in this statement: M f0 
-The State will not prosecute on Count 2*bf the information. 
Trial Judge not bound. I understand that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the Judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty or no contest. No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
/I r* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but 1 do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
1 am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am jO years of age. I have attended school through the /x_ grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If 1 do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. 1 was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. 1 am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty or no contest plea(s), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before I have been sentenced and final judgment 
has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if! show good cause* I will 
not be allowed to withdraw my plea after sentence has been announced.. 
Dated this of &c>/*&*>r 
,A^^?^j&t^ 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
T certify that I am the attorney for David Shumway Nielsen> the defendant above, and 
that 1 know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her, I have discussed it 
with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accuratg>arid true, y^ 
- ^^6—-
ATTORNEY -F§R DEFENDANT 
Bar^o.?//j: 
< v-<£) 
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r : Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the above-captioned case. I have 
reviewed this statement of defendant and find the factual basis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in this Statement. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would 
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that 
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No. 
Order 
Based en the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty or no contest plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty or no contest plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this /?day of_ oM 
/A." 
V <••'".• 
:"::,-,2009. 
•
:£}OJL 
JUDQE HADKELD 
49 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RHOME D. ZABR1SKIE, #9113 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
3507 North University Ave., Ste. 150 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7680 
Facsimile: (801) 375-7686 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEAS 
vs. 
DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN, 
Defendant 
Case No.: 091100141 & 
091100142 
COMES NOW the defendant by and through counsel, Rhome D. Zabriskie, pursuant to 
UC A 77-13-6(2)(a), and motions the Court to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas in the 
above-captioned cases. The defendant argues that when he entered his guilty pleas he did so 
without having full knowledge of the potential consequences of doing so. One of those 
consequences is the possibility that the two convictions will likely result in his Idaho probation 
being violated. Prior to entering his plea in the above-captioned cases he relied upon a statement 
of Sgt. Millaway mat convictions to three or more misdemeanors would result in his Idaho 
probation being violated. David now has indication that he may be violated in Idaho for his two 
misdemeanor guilty pleas. Furthermore, David has expressed to his psychologists Dr. Gary 
Sazama that, "...he did not wan t to plead to the charges but agreed after strong urging by his 
. ' 1 
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attorney" (see Dr. Sazama report included with PS I). 
Traditionally, Utah Courts have been liberal in evaluating whether there are appropriate 
grounds for permitting a defendant to withdraw guilty pleas to misdemeanor charges. One 
example is the Nephi District Court where Judge Eyre has an established policy of permitting 
defendant's to withdraw guilty pleas in any misdemeanor cases without any inquiry as to "good 
euase." In this case the defendant has shown good cause demonstrating that he did not realize a 
collateral consequence (being violated in Idaho) of entering said pleas. He has also inferred that 
he entered his guilty pleas, at least in part, as a result of pressure being placed upon him by his 
attorney. Based upon the foregoing. David should be permitted to withdraw the guilty pleas he 
has entered in both cases. 
U it / __ 
.2009....... > 
^ - - - * : - ; 
:erea m ootn cases. 
DATED this 21 ~dav of j V d ? w W ± ^ l . 
>Z RHOME D. ZABRISKIE 
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ab'Stft 2C6N<*th, Sutoo 
"* |j6gpn,UMh 84321 
(435}7S2^&io ...^ 
NovemW1<S,2009 
fkst Judrcki District Court 
Judge Ben Ha&fieid 
43 North Mafci 
Bright City, Utah §4302 
RE: ©a^^Niefeea 
¥o«r Honor* -
Sefh ^ obiasQri of AMtEKibfffion ahdPatoie lias ^ uestediprovidethe acHirtiviib a«mamary 
of Mr, Ttfieteerf s treatment and my Jtel»^^tegsiaxng tfeofienses and ehatges he is dae to 
ijesismenCeci^ GiL 
trSjktedJSex^Specjfic 3 & e r ^ ^ i h ^ Hehad ^ offettded on MsAqghtBr 
dunBga^aiJieB^ tnoludcd fcuildifig a modes! tjf fris 
fcffensetb defen^^ "My findings indicated -
•Dai^stfSfe^ linked 
=(Fali^ Spriftg)i Arcexaniiixafi©^ since 
Wearly;twentfe& ^ d f h i s J e g ^ As 
Oavidiiaagotl^ ^  sleep -
deprivation psychosis andltotat tos^^meoiofy dufttig i^sxjlodr^ f ho&pit&lzatum. 
_ Buriag the two and a fo i l fye^ l^^ ha has required basphalization cm 
tbtee#ccasion& 3&uidisii0tptese^ Heig/and appears completely lionfcal, 
wflfchav^exh^^ 
Thegoatesf o m . t ^ ^ Ih^tapy^si'eqiiiredby the cdurts, 
esi^lisfcavi^iemet^ 
<^o^e>an& j ^ ^ \ritS5in tecoxriififfibtibil levelsatid 
toest&liafoavia©^^ 
and earfy intervention. 
Davidv i^cceasfyily cottiglded d l a ^ He bad 
<son§ttf#tedawery effective relapseprev^ttoti pltoaiid was completely compliant taking 
-mcdleaiiQaand monitoring blood levels. H^estabiished^ 
IwdliettaidWEKMq^pa^ tliiferftinatcly^evea with bU best efforts, David 
^porieaoedtwoaea^naliyT^^ both raqufting hospitalisation. At the onset 
of each ofdiese episodes Itevidbacam^^ spent exorbitant 
4' 2 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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amountsofmonsy :aadbecaaaeh35>er.3exu£iteA. AslsissStepdepr&atiori-ocudHnied,he 
required hospitalization and developed a step 4eprivatioa psychosis. 
FoUowi^ikese e p i ^ to tnatoefiaacetherapy to 
control and Hmitmaiiic episodes. ^ 'iDa^ di^ uiic&iQfn medication, regularbldod levtil cheeks and 
ntttfflsQf^ 
effect Oa^d was meficuloiis mamfflng:Msme^ca^^ diet* andexerdse and blood level 
testing. Withtl3&^ 
maintenance visits, 
la eariy wnter of 200^ IbBsiness. Headiftittedthat 
he &k sorryforJieJ^ecaa^ were hornless and Hvfng out of 
their ear. Ifcadmxtt^ ^ and took 
tfce«fle as ^ c^fetker". ^fffe^om^ I 
ftacsms^eein^s^^ Hater learned thai 
David hMbecome^fo^^ Me m^e heripart of 
Ms^mpan^ 
father. T taterlean^ 
pressure ^ ml^r^ntft to i3ome,:u^ fee discovered during ther^y, 
ixk &pM p£WQ93S)&ni& ^ tts4 ^-^S^P^bS^ Bijrthe time T saw him, 
te faM<Slig^^ Af&fe^Mt met 
ttewi^jgitf^^ It was v^^-iiairipdiately -apparent ^ / 
lomafli^fieh^^a«}e&- vetjr i^etff i^ awomas wh^exftiKtted^tong / V 
Boti^ lme^Pfefsonaiiiy} EMsaiy^ Mghitehed-ielapfiB ' 
:prevet$dns^laB$^ 
€ < ^ e t s between these^^ 
sottie^atmariies^^ ©MddoesiioiiitoftaMsto^of 
dottie^c-viqlcn^ 
de£eno4atfi&:tod^  At this^point, fi>a*dd orclered-herto 
loaveias fii8tef's honibj ^ ^ch:fl^^uMitdj^o^ S^.ltisadng convicts giiicfcjy escalated I am 
flotsoiwn^ijfe 
W£\e\a}mi&& 
WtmQffetxveandmfta FdHcrvyltigiBavid's 
BE&st fbrike second &ue due to aMeg^on&that&e&ad violated a.ponc>t$ctive order atteinpfiQg to 
eoatacther* he-adcaitfed hebecamo despondent* hopelessaboutbeing^^ incai^emted agal^ and 
attempted stdcfdo, 
Fdllowiftgifour months of incameratio^ Bavidretumed to treatment on a regular basis while 
awaitiiig Mai on these charges* *£wo ^ weeksa^Aviien -fcretamedfrom vacation* I was 
ecmjpletejy sho<&edt^tlie ^  ^ he bad 
pfamaed jfe explained he d?d a o t ; ^ ^ agreed after strong urging by 
fas attorney. 
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Up to tJie^me that David met m&became mvdivad -vdth tliJs.V^Ottto l^ie had tiat had any 
pttfclatris what 46 ever. He had been completely eompUant WiQx therapy, Itte4icatt66s tod bafi 
appropriately 6sitsA sevetal diffstenl women. 1 believe DaVid made poor choices getting 
involvfaiwiaxan unheaKHy woman snd should have responded to she boundaries that he saw 
being crossed aa they became mote evolved* He has been able to isolate his desire to have 
dompanionahip as the detenninlng&otot that HiSk his naivety and poor judgment 
1 hope your honor will look at thtrivhole picture of how this case came together. T believe this is 
a fca&s 6f a poor relaifa&ship choice and Wo people each with Hh&ir owi mental health difficulties 
which fueled and ugly split -up, not domestic violence or stalking. 
1 appreciate your consideration. 
Respectfully^ 
•/Ujf *£~~,rt-Q 
Gary FStoaha, Pb JDt 
UcehsedCtiBkalPsychoio^ -
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Online Court Assistant Program 
Request for Civil 
Stalking Injunction 
1 Petitioner (person needing protection): 
ShtrtSusanntBoltz 
Mil mmo u*i 
Addrc$$ aad phone # (to keep private, leave btatik); 
436W.223SS. 
Perry, Vtah 84302 
435-23P-m& 
$5$~733-24Q9(Work) 
Namaand phone ntombej; of Petidoner^tbrney (If My): 
2 'Respondent (personyouneecHobo protected-from): 
\ BaiMSkmMyWtefan J 
' ftet MWto Lssl 
Oiherflainefr vst&Drm 
Address; ' 
24MS.50Qw. 
fm%ut<jkmm 
A3Bd#can grant* stalking .injunction only If the Respondent did these S things: 
(1)' The Respondent tufted you specifically, rwoor jnoTetfme$/uSr^e^^ 
vfcUiHy close to. you, made Verbal or written threat to you; or did something ih*i was threatening, 
(2) TheRespondent toew or should have Icnownthawhe^taibng would cai^eyoa to fear thatyou or a family member 
could bo physically httftor emotionally distressed, or rhat-a jre^sonabtepcfson would be arraid of being physically 
hurt or emotionally distressed, and 
(3) The Respondent staling actually made you nr an immediate1 fa daily member- emotionally disOreiaed or fearful that 
yeo would be hart. An "immediate family member** means your spouse, thild> sibling, or any other person who 
. live* with you now, or who lived with you within thepast £ tadntb$. 
Notol to addition to your own statements in MiXcqwsi, you mnarptovidtsome other evidence of stalking, like police 
report sworn $tatoments from wimesseSv andiotapeSjphtoiiUter^etc, 
For a complete definition of stalking, see Utah Code §§.7$&lW.$and 77-3a-
mm 
-3 Provide as much information a s you can about the ftespondem. (/ you don't know, write ^unknown: * 
Respondent's Employer (Name and address): 
Traffic $emc*s Inc. 2460 S, 500 M Perry, Utah 
*f$*rtfer Ota Stdihing Ir^ mctfon - \&t. ApprovalBoard of Qta/tct Court JtitgKjvne&OS 
A"**-
(f[O\0O^O% Case Number: 
Court: First District Court 
CoUnty; Box Elder State: Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Online Com Attiiianct Program 
Best place and time to find theR&pon6m: Plaa: Logan Regional Bosptial Time: anytime 
Other addrWes (hangout*): at home 
Describe Respondent's vehicle; Make: Pord Model; pickup 
Ye&r.unhio Colon green/white License Plate; unknown 
If more than one vehicle, describe here: Make: Pontine Mode): Bonneville 
Ym; unknown Color: «&#• License ?lzxt: unknown 
Ha* the Respondent used weapons or been violent in the past? Q Yas © No Q Don't know 
Is the Respondent a law enforcement officer, government investigator 
or licensed private investigator? Q Yes 5) No 0 Don't know 
4 Describe the stalking below; 
a. When.and where did the stalking events happen? (Attach additional pages if necessary,) 
1* stalking evenr. 
When: -
M13M009 
Where: 
at my home 
2*mllcin£eveffl: 
When: 
. . M14I2M9 
Where; 
Sms^Bwy.mwmard.Viak 
b, Who did yon report the-staBdag to (if anyone).? 
Peny Police, Utah Highway Patrol 
a list names of a3l people who witnessed the stalking: 
CkandlerHottz 
d List any evidence you have of the stalking, like Iranscripts, audiotape, police report?, photos, sworn statement* 
from witnesses (affidavits), etc. You rraist attach ai least oneof these to this form, 
sworn witness statement, police reports 
t. Describe what the stalker did ™d why h made you or your family member fed emotionally distressed or afraid of 
being physically harmed, and why it would have made a reasonable person feel emotionally distressed or afraid of 
being physically harmed: 
RgQtffiStfofCMSiaikfftgli^ndfon | M Apprtivad&y Board JQI Qlstiict Court Mprs, June 20QC 
A.J Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Onlfat Court A&isanefc Program 
t 
On Monday night? April 13,2009, David was in my home. My son sentnk a text saying that he w&s at 
my house and thai he was manic* Band was digging through my personal belongings saying that 
he needed stuff to sell. My son, Chandler,, tried io lock up as much as possible. When I arrived 
home, my son unlocked my bedroom door and forked me inside saying that he would try to get 
David to leave. David was refusing To leave stating ifat he was going tp move in with us. 1 went 
and knocked on his door and told Dayid thai he needed to lean. Be flung the door open and 
'swung- his arm around my neck, yankedme into the bedroom, and had my arm pimud behind my 
back to try to take my cellphone. I called out to my son to call the police. My son came running 
into the warn and tried to get the phone frdm DAve, Hyson punchedlpAve in the ch&si once and 
was able to get my phone to cdlthe police. While my son was on the phone in the living room, I 
triedto get £>Ave out of'the house. Me was yelling and screening. He grabbed me againandmy 
son puncedhimin t)*e head Bo released me and took off Into the stveeh The police came and he 
was found and arrested On Tuesday, AprUJ4; 2U9, he was released fqom the hospital when he 
had been taken by police,the night before because he told them that he had taken a bunch ofpUls. 
I received a phone call from an unknown number. It was him. Be wanted me to come and get him 
because he was without a wallet or Wttnd^wh Wandering in downtown -Brigham in& T-shirt, 
shorts, and slippers, He said ihat he'COuldn'tgeiahoM ofhisyarents. I.picked him up to iake'him 
toWUtardtog&UisvehteUatone^ The whole way there; he was yelling at me and 
accusing me of things. ^enwegotiohktrMtki[hande& togetaut 
He gmbbedmyartn mid grabbed my wdtUiandceUpnone.l tried to get my stuff and dragged me 
outtflhedrivefs seatout ofthepassenger'door/My hand got citt and! wasbteedingl was still 
tryvtgiogetmywattet. J tried to wme someone down, ft wasan off-duty WMIardpaUce officer. 
The officer came andputDAve in the front of hit truck and Men came to check on me because 1 
was bleeding, As he .got to my door, X>a»ehadgdt out cfihetruck andwasrunningto his truck. 
7%eoJffcer called disjtat& 
again,. Be was then arrested Be was released fivrnjaS to Bear River Mental Health and. 
immediately called mt on WEdnesday^ April 1$ 200$. 
\ 
t Ota facts: 
There have been other times whehhe has been violent with me. At the first of March 2Q09, he had 
gone about 17 days with nosUep^llisparentsh^askedmetohelpta of him. The first 
night that! was with him, he?was swearing at me,$idled a knife and ran it across my chest and 
stopped at my throat He stcaed that he shotMntdo it because IcouM get hx^ The nexidayi at work, 
he picked up a big icy snowball and hit me in the face with U. Re pushed me thatday.The other thing 
that scares me about him, is that he says thathtdreams"aboutseeingmeandmy children dead After 
his release from ihehospttal, he would show up atmysohoolandkave notes on my car. He would 
take pictures of me through the crack of the door whUe^l wos in class, 
P Checkhert ifyou naedmore spac&+ Ask the cktkfor iht "Describe Sielklns "form. Fillii our cmd atiech it to this/emi 
fteQUCJtfof Civil Steflfos tojanelkrt 3 ol& Approved by 8oa#<rfDtetrfcl Court Judgas, June 2006 
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Oftlme Court Attistttctfrogrm 
Tha Petitioner must read and s ign below: 
I swear than 
• I am ihcPetitioner and I have read this petition, 
•• I am a victim of staBcin^ and believe the Respondeat is the stalfcer, and 
• I Jive in this county or the Respondent Jives in this coiyiiSbr the stalking took pi 
Date: Petitioner's signatured A ' j ^ ^ J 
If the Petitioner is a mioor, then parent or guardian must sign below. 
I swear that; 
• I am Petitionees parent or guardian and J have read this petition, 
• Petitioneris a victim of stalking and J believe the Respondent fe the striker, and 
• The petitioner Eves in this county or the Respondent fives in ihfs cotinfy4 or the stalking rook place 14 this 
<w*nty. 
Date: ,.,_M Parent or iuardian^ ij^naturerk 
Print Parent or guardian's name: 
Clerk or Notary Public Wis out berfow; 
Subscribed and 
CkrkorNm 
» bxtidtf-
.County, Utah 
Request for Civil StiIWng lAjurtefan SeU Approved by ao$m xrt Q&rttf Court Judges. Jona floes 
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Stephen R. Hadfield, 5707 
Box Elder County Attorney 
Brandon J, Maynard, 8561 
9 W. Forest St., Ste. 310 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (435) 734-3329 
Fax: (435) 723-0785 _ _ _ _ _ _ „ . _ _ _ _ _ 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN, 
Defendant 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED matter came on regularly for sentencing on 08/03/2010, 
before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield. The Defendant appeared personally together 
with his counsel of record, L. Todd Sessions. The State was represented by Brandon 
J. Maynard of the Box Elder County Attorney's Office. 
No legal or other reason having been shown why judgment should not be 
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant is hereby convicted of 
the following crime(s): 
1: VIOLATION OF STALKING INJUNCTION, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5, 
a class A misdemeanor. 
based upon his guilty plea. 
Based upon said Judgment of Conviction, it is the Judgment and Order of the 
Court that the Defendant is hereby sentenced to a term of 365 days in the Box Eider 
A f 9 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER ON 
SENTENCING 
Court Case #: 091100141 
Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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435 723-2786 p.2 
County Jail. The total time suspended for this charge is 255 days. Credit is granted for 
110 days previously served. Sentence to be served concurrent witn the sentence in 
case #091100142. 
Defendant to pay a fine of $950, plus interest, 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole with the following 
conditions: 
1. Violate no state, city, or federal law except minor traffic. 
2. Successfully complete a mental health evaluation and counseling as 
recommended. 
3„ Serve 110 days jail with credit for 110 days served. 
4. Pay a fine and surcharge of $925 plus S25 Court Security fee. 
5. Have no contact with the victim, Shere Holtz. 
The Court retains jurisdiction for further action in this matter. 
•; • DATED this I® day of A * * « 2010. 
r3~fl. 
•'. -... . Ben H. Hadfield, Judge 
\-\ v First Judicial District Co 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby ce,1ify that on the day of LLou2p_^_2G1C, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, postage pre-paia to;^ 
L. Todd Sessions 
80 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 
CNV^Ktl 
Legal Secretary 
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Stephen R. Hadfteld, 5107 
Box Elder County Attorney 
Brandon J. Maynard, 8561 
9W. Forest St, Ste. 31 p 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (435) 734-3B29 
Fax: (435) 723-0785 
rm » »,certMy tna ©w deter*** 
Ayftf$<H, /Of'*. 
tewsdfrom ?-*-*? *> 
tf-gvy^r. A tate> rf J£±Jam 
BOX ELDER COUNT* 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CffiJ-/0?Z6 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN 
Defendant 
tSS> 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER ON S 
SENTENCING 
Court Case #: 091100142 
C3 
x2 
Judge: Ben H, Hadfield o? 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED matter came on regularly for sentencing on 08/03/2010, 
before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield. The Defendant appeared personally together 
with his counsel of record, L Todd Sessions. The State was represented ty BrandoriN 
J. Maynard of the Box Eider County Attorney's Office. 
No legal or other reason having been-shown why judgment should not be 
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant }s hereby convicted of 
the following crime(s): 
1: VIOLATION OF SJALK1NG INJUNCTION, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5, 
' • • a class A misdemeanor 
based upon his guilty piea 
Based upon said Judgment of Conviction, ft is the Judgment and Order of the 
:A. 1 1 
(ttf 
AUG 1 0 2010 
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Court that the Defendant is hereby sentenced to a term of one (1) year. The total time 
suspended for this charge is one (1) year. Sentence to be served concuTent with the 
sentence on #0911001 
Probation is to b^ supervised by Adult Probation & Paroie with the following 
conditions: 
1. Violate no state, pity, or federal law except minor traffic. 
2. Probation concurrent with case #091100141. 
3. All terms and conditions as ordered in case #091100141, 
The Court retains1 jurisdiction for further action in this matter. 
PATTED this //? day of / f u j , 2010. 
^ • : • • ' ' • - • • • 
.4V i I 
&J.:k. 
y - T;> : • . ' • • • ^•fjeniri Hadfield, Judge 
p r e j u d i c i a l District Cou 
A\> 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
hereby certify that on trie J^^ day of QtiAfy^ 2010; I mailed a trsje and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, postage pre-paid t 
L. Todd Sessions 
80 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Legal Secretary 
JAM 
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Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, 
the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right 
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a 
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
/J.P3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-
13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall 
advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the 
defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to 
advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(i)(l)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being 
made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the 
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the 
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
Aid Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
103. 
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. 
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient 
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
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